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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 56 February, 1954 Number 1
SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS (RES GESTAE)
THOMAS P. HARDMAN*
N the initial installment of this article83 the writer discussed the
the Spontaneous Declarations doctrine chiefly from the stand-
point of whether "spontaneity," the rationale of this exception to
the hearsay rule, may spring only from situations in which there was
a startling event (the Wigmorean theory), or whether it may also
spring from any occasion, startling or other, when the challenged
hearsay statement was made "while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition which the statement narrates or describes or
explains, or immediately thereafter" (the Thayer theory). In that
installment it was found that there are West Virginia decisions
supporting each of these views: first one theory is proclaimed, then
another, often with unpredictable results. 8 4
In this concluding installment it will be assumed, unless other-
wise indicated, that the event or condition involved in the dis-
cussion was k startling occurrence within the meaning of the
Wigmorean doctrine inasmuch as the points herein considered
pertain particularly if not solely to situations falling within the
* Dean of the College of Law, West Virginia University.
83 Hardman, SPONTANEOUS DECLARATIONS (Res Gestae), 54 W. VA. L. REv.
93 (1952).
84 Cf. Kenna, J., in Reynolds v. T. W. Grant Co., 117 W. Va. 615, 619, 186
S.E. 603, 604, 605 (1936): "The holdings under, and discussions of, the doctrine
of res gestae appear to contain a preponderance of confusion, so that it is
almost impossible to reach a conclusion with reference to it that cannot at
least partially be undermined by decided cases and text comments. A part of
this confusion seems to come from seeking to apply the rule where there is no
necessity to invoke it because of the fact that the proof offered is not hearsay
at all, and a part of it seems to come from the fact that the rule is frequently
sought to be invoked where, in reality, the evidence sought to be introduced
is admissible under some other exception to the hearsay rule."
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Wigmorean restriction; it will be similarly assumed that the
challenged hearsay statement was made while the declarant was
under the stress of a nervous excitement caused by his perception
of the startling event or condition, so that the declaration may be
regarded as "spontaneous" and therefore admissible unless some
court-sanctioned limitation should require a different conclusion.
Four of these limitations or supposed limitations were dealt with
in the first part of this article; and it is the purpose of this install-
ment to comment briefly upon the more important of the remaining
qualifications or alleged qualifications of this exception to the
hearsay rule.
5. Must the challenged hearsay assertion relate to the
circumstances of the occurrence preceding it? Must
it "elucidate" the startling occasion and not refer
to some prior matter?
The leading textbook on evidence lays it down rather cate-
gorically that this question must be answered in the affirmative.85
Moreover, the latest noteworthy case in this jurisdiction, herein-
after examined at some length, declares unequivocally that a hear-
say statement, to be admissible under this exception, must "relate
to contemporaneous occurrences" and must not "refer to a past
event." 8  But does this exception necessarily exclude a "sponta-
neous" declaration which refers to a prior but relevant matter? And
is it the law in West Virginia that such an utterance is, for that
reason, inadmissible?
First of all, why should a declaration, if it is spontaneous
(i.e., unreflective and therefore reasonably trustworthy), be ex-
cluded merely because the declaration happens to "elucidate" some
relevant matter anterior to the startling occurrence? Quaere
whether this limitation, to the extent that it is actually enforced
by the courts, is not a spurious one borrowed from the so-called
"verbal act" doctrine which does not involve the hearsay rule at
all, inasmuch as the "elucidating" declarations are not offered to
prove the truth of the facts asserted but are offered as being them-
selves an operative part of the acts in question?87
85 See WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1750, 1754 (Sd ed. 1940).
86 Coates v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 W. Va. 455, 458, 57 S.E.2d 265, 268
(1945).
87 Cf. MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW oF EVIDENCE § 432 (1937).
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Fortunately we have two comparatively recent West Virginia
decisions presenting this problem: Gilmore v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., s8 and Coates v. Montgomery Ward & Co.89 But, unfortunately,
these cases, though involving very similar facts and decided during
the same term of court, seem to reach diametrically opposite con-
clusions with respect to this problem. In each of these cases the
issue was the same, namely, whether the defendant had negligently
maintained a slippery floor by reason of which the plaintiff, a cus-
tomer, had fallen and injured herself. In the Gilmore case the
challenged hearsay declaration was a statement by an employee who
had personally observed the event and who had said immediately
after the customer's fall at about 11:30 in the morning that the
floor had been waxed the night before. Obviously the startling
occurrence was the plaintiff's fall; and it would seem equally
obvious that the assertion clearly referred to a prior event, namely,
placing wax on the floor the night before the event. Nevertheless
our court held the evidence admissible as a spontaneous declara-
tion. Said the court:
"However, a different situation exists as to the testimony
of plaintiff in which she reiterated an extrajudicial statement
made by an unidentified clerk who first rendered plaintiff
assistance after her accident. It is clearly shown that the
clerk reached plaintiff immediately after her fall. The spon-
taneity of the clerk's statement cannot be denied; and it is
reasonable to infer from all the evidence that such clerk was a
witness to the accident and was laboring under the stress of
emotion or excitement at the time of uttering the statement.
This being true, the clerk's statement constituted a part of
the res gestae, and was admissible .... 90
In the Coates case the challenged hearsay statement was an
assertion by an employee who said, immediately after the plaintiff's
fall and while she was aiding the plaintiff, that she, the employee,
had very nearly fallen that same morning at exactly the same spot.
In holding the evidence inadmissible the court said (inter alia):
". .. Furthermore, the statement did not relate to the
actual injury of the plaintiff below. Res gestae means a part
88 133 W. Va. 342, 56 S.E.2d 105 (1949).
80 138 W. Va. 455, 57 S.E.2d 265 (1949).
go 133 W. Va. at 347, 56 S.E.2d at 108.
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of the thing done. The thing done is not any declarations
made at that time but declarations that relate to contem-
poraneous occurrences. Reynolds v. Grant, 117 W. Va. 615,
186 S.E. 603.... Here the declaration referred to a past event:
Mrs. Lee having almost fallen before Mrs. Coates' injury.... ,,91
"In order to be admissible as part of the res gestae a
declaration must relate to the occurrences which gave rise to
the application of the rule and not to happenings prior
thereto." 92
If the above-quoted reasoning in the Coates case is sound, it
would seem that the Gilmore case was erroneously decided; for, as
hereinbefore indicated, the hearsay assertion admitted in that case
referred to a happening prior to the startling event, namely, the
waxing of the floor the night before the fall, and it was an event
more remotely past than the one in the Coates case. Query, then:
Does the Coates case overrule the Gilmore case on the point here
considered?
To begin with, it must be conceded that courts often use
language similar to that in the Coates case.9 3  And, it must be
admitted, a statement made soon after a startling occurrence but
referring to a happening prior thereto is generally either (1)
irrelevant,9 4 or (2) not spontaneous.9 5 It is usually not spontaneous
for the reason that as a rule such an utterance involves reflection
or premeditation and therefore is not sufficiently trustworthy to
come within this exception. 6  Hence cases purporting to impose
this limitation generally reach a sound conclusion, and would
generally reach the same conclusion by a proper application of the
exception if there were no such limitation or supposed limitation.
But where as in the Gilmore case the court is satisfied that such a
statement is spontaneous, the hearsay assertion would seem to fall
within this exception, for the reason for the exception exists, and
all relevant evidence should be admitted unless some rule or prin-
ciple of law, rationally interpreted and applied, requires it to be
excluded.9 7 Indeed Wigmore concedes that on principle there is
9' 13 W. Va. at 458, 57 S.E.2d at 268.
92 Id., Point 3 of the syllabus.
93 See, e.g., a dictum in Collins v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 122 W. Va. 171,
174, 8 S.E.2d 825, 826 (1940).
94 See MCCORMICK AND RAY, op. cit. supra note 87, § 432.
95 Cf. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1750 par. c, 1754.
9 Ibid.
97 Cf. THAYER, A PREUiMINARY TREAISE ON EVIDENCE 530 (1898).
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perhaps no less reason for letting in a declaration relating to some
distinct prior circumstance than for letting in declarations relating
to the startling event.9 But he adds that "Apparently the Courts
are disposed, on one theory or another, to enforce this restriction." 99
As to this latter statement by Wigmore, it can only be said that
sometimes, as in the Gilmore case and in several other cases,Ou
a few of which are herein considered, the courts do decide the
question on principle, and do not enforce this restriction or
supposed restriction.
A noteworthy example of such decisions is Jack v. Mutual
Reserve Fund Life Assn,O1 which Wigmore disposes of rather
feebly in a footnote by characterizing the holding as "an example
of extremely liberal interpretations of this limitation.", 02 In that
case it appeared that a Dr. Lipscomb had handed the declarant
a box containing a capsule and had told him to take it before
going to bed. There was evidence that Lipscomb and Jack were
parties to a conspiracy to defraud the defendant; and that the
declarant, after receiving the capsule, swallowed it and became
violently sick, and that while so suffering he made this statement:
"Dr. Lipscomb killed me with a capsule he gave me tonight, and
Guy Jack had my life insured and hired Dr. Lipscomb to kill me."
Clearly the latter part of this statement referred to a past
event, and there was an objection to this part of the statement on
the ground "that it narrated a past transaction."'1 3  The court,
however, held the declaration admissible. To characterize this
holding as an "extremely liberal interpretation of this limitation"
would seem to be an example of twisting the facts of a case to make
them fit a theory. Such a limitation, if realistically enforced in
this case, would certainly have excluded the declaration.
This decision was rather recently followed in the case of
Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead.0 4 In that case an issue was whether
the defendant had negligently permitted vegetable debris to ac-
cumulate on the floor of the defendant's store whereby the plaintiff,
98 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1750.
99 Id. § 1754.
100 See, citing a number of cases pro and con, 163 A.L.R. 15, at 193-198
(1946).
101 113 Fed. 49 (5th Cir. 1902).
102 See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1754 n.3.
103 113 Fed. 49, 53. The court interpreted the objection as indicated in
the text.
104 90 F.2d 374 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
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a customer, slipped, fell and was injured. The challenged declara-
tion was a statement by a clerk in the store, made immediately
after the fall, that the vegetables had been there on the floor for
a couple of hours. It seems clear enough, that in a strict sense at
least, the declaration referred to a past event, namely, the placing
of vegetable debris on the floor two hours prior to the fall, just
as the declaration in the Coates case referred to a prior slipperiness
of the floor, the prior slipping on the floor by another person.
In holding the declaration admissible the court said, apropos of
this point:
"The objection of the defendant is that what the clerk
said was narrative in character, in that he said that the vege-
tables had been on the floor for several hours. This objection
confuses the content of the utterance with its character, as
being spontaneous in respect of the event or fact to which it
relates .... It seems apparent that the comments of the clerk
as to the time during which they [the vegetables] had been
there were as spontaneous as any other portion of his
remarks."105
Moreover the leading West Virginia case of Reynolds v. W. T.
Grant Co., o06 which is relied upon by both the Gilmore case and the
Coates case, tends to support this conclusion. In the Reynolds case,
which also involved an issue as to whether the defendant had
negligently maintained a slippery floor by reason of which the
plaintiff, a customer, had fallen and sustained an injury, the
hearsay declaration, made by an employee of the defendant soon
after the fall, was to the effect that someone else had fallen at the
same place earlier in the day. The court ultimately excluded the
statement on the sound ground that it did not sufficiently appear
that the declarant had had the requisite opportunity for personal
observation. However, except for that lack of personal observa-
tion, it seems fairly clear from the court's reasoning that the
declaration would have been regarded as admissible. Moreover
the court in the Coates case cites only one West Virginia case to
support the asserted limitation, and that is the Reynolds case.
It is true that in that part of the opinion in the Reynolds case
which deals with the alleged admissibility of the declaration as
105 Id. at 376-377.
106 117 W. Va. 615, 186 S.E. 603 (1936).
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an admission by an agent, the court pointed out that the declaration
"related to a past happening", and it therefore did not relate to
an act performed by him within his authority as an agent. But
immediately thereafter, in dealing with the admissibility of the
statement as a Spontaneous Declaration, the court said:
"Concerning the question whether this evidence is ad-
missible as constituting a part of the res gestae, we are of the
opinion that it does not fall within that exception. We start.
of course, with the proposition that the evidence is hearsay
and for that reason is to be excluded. It follows, that if the
plaintiff wishes to bring the evidence within any of the
recognized exceptions of the hearsay rule, the burden is upon
him who adduces the evidence to show that all of the elements
constituting the exception are present. We are of the opinion
that one vital element, at least, is lacking in the evidence
sought to be introduced in the case at bar. The store manager
stated that another person had fallen the same morning, but
the source of his information to that effect does not appear.
For all that appears, third persons may have informed the
store manager to that effect. If that were so, then his declara-
tion at or shortly after the time that the plaintiff fell would
be merely a hearsay statement of hearsay information. We
think that the burden is upon the person adducing the evidence
to bring it clearly out of this doubtful category. Had the
manager declared that he had seen some other person fall at
the the same point that morning, thus making his declaration
relate to facts within his own knowledge, the exception might
properly apply.'_1 °7
The italicized statement (italics supplied) seems to negative
the existence of a limitation excluding declarations merely because
they relate to a happening prior to the startling event. It must
be conceded, however, that in an earlier part of the opinion the
court had used some broad language which might be interpreted
as supporting such a limitation. Said the court: "If the declarant
is laboring under stress of emotion or excitement so that his
declaration relating to the occurrence from which that excitement
or emotion sprang was spontaneous in a way that precludes the
reflection upon which falsehood is based, then the declaration
falls truly within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and
the question of agency is beside the point."'1°8 This general
107 117 W. Va. at 622-23, 186 S.E. at 606.
108 Id. at 620, 186 S.E. at 605.
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language, however, can hardly be regarded as overbalancing the
court's subsequent specific statement above quoted.
Nor is the Coates case, the latest West Virginia case of im-
portance in point, believed to overrule the Gilmore case; for in
the Coates case the court first excluded the evidence on the ad-
mittedly sound ground that it did not appear that the declarant
had the requisite personal knowledge. Consequently it would
seem that the second ground assigned by the court for excluding
the evidence cannot be regarded as an authoritative precedent for
the doubtful proposition therein propounded, because not only was
the second ground assigned unnecessary in order to dispose of the
point under discussion but this gratuitously assigned reason is
contra to the holding in the Gilmore case which the Coates case
cites with approval, although on another point. It is believed
therefore that the second reason assigned in the Coates case is only
a dictum. To be sure, the inconsistent statement in the Coates
case did happen to find its way into the syllabus; but, as the writer
has attempted to prove eleswhere in this Review, the mere fact
that a statement, otherwise a dictum, happens to have found its
way into the syllabus does not make it authoritative: it is still
a dictum.10 9 As our court has said and held, with respect to
another unnecessary statement by the court which had unfor-
tunately found its way into the syllabus: the too-broad statement
in the syllabus "is not the law and never has been in this state":
it is not the law for the reason, as the court well put it in that
case, that "the language in the syllabus is broader than the opinion
warrants"."10
The most obvious explanation of the inconsistency in these
two cases is that in the Gilmore case the court used the modern
rationale of this exception, namely, spontaneity, whereas in the
Coates case the court used the old res gestae terminology with its
supposed requisite of contemporaneity. Yet our court had pre-
viously laid it down in the much-cited Collins case that "spon-
taneity rather than contemporaneity is now the generally recognized
test of admissibility. 'The spontaneity of the utterance is the
guaranty of its trustworthiness.' "III Consistency in decisions can
109 See Hardman, "THE LAW"-IN WEST VIRGIMA, 47 W. VA. L.Q. 23 (1940).
110 See State v. Graham, 94 W. Va. 67, 71, 72, 117 S.E. 699 (1923), thus
commenting on the syllabus in State v. Burnett, 47 W. Va. 731, 35 S.E. 983 (1900).
I1 Collins v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 122 W. Va. 171, 173, 8 S.E.2d 825 (1940).
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hardly be obtained when first one rationale and then another is
invoked in applying the same legal rule. The life of a rule of law
lies in its reason: where the reason for a legal rule applies, the
rule applies (or should), at least if the legal rule is a sound one,
and the soundness of the Spontaneous Declaration doctrine is
almost universally conceded.
6. Are self-serving declarations admissible under this
exception?
Although there seems to be a widespread belief in this juris-
diction (and in some other jurisdictions) that there is a Special
Rule of Evidence excluding self-serving extrajudicial assertions,
it is submitted that the authoritative precedents in point in West
Virginia do not, if properly interpreted, support this belief: the
judicial expressions supporting it are merely dicta. Such self-
serving declarations, if offered to prove the truth of the facts
asserted, are condemned by the hearsay rule but are admissible if
they come within one of the recognized exceptions, e.g., the Spon-
taneous Declarations doctrine. The writer has, however, discussed
this problem rather fully in a prior issue of the Review, and so
the question will not be further considered here. 11 2
7. To what extent, if any, does this exception admit
extrajudicial complaints of rape or other violent
sex offenses?
In the United States, the orthodox view is that this exception
does not admit the details of a complaint of rape although the mere
fact of complaint, when the person attacked has testified, is
admissible. 11 ' But that limited use of the complaint does not
violate the hearsay rule at all since the evidence, so used, is offered
circumstantially, in corroboration of testimony, and not for the
purpose of establishing the truth of the matter asserted.1 4  Of
course such extrajudicial complaints may be offered in other ways
not needing a hearsay exception to justify admissibility.1" 5 Some
112 See Hardman, Hearsay: "Self-Serving Declarations," 52 W. VA. L. REV.
81 (1950).
11 See State v. Peck, 90 W. Va. 272, 275-276 (1922); WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§
1134-1140. The modem English cases generally admit the detailed statements,
though with some limitations. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1760, 1761.
114 See WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1134-1140, 1760, 1761.
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authorities claim that such complaints may never be properly con-
sidered under this exception.""
But when the detailed statement of a complaint of rape or
any other violent sex offense is so offered as to violate the hearsay
rule, why does not the ordinary Spontaneous Declarations doctrine
admit the statement as to details, e.g., as to the identification of
the assailant, if the statement is made while the declarant was
under the stress of a nervous excitement caused by the assault?
The orthodox view is thus expressed by the West Virginia court
in State v. Peck"7 decided in 1922:
"It is well settled by the great majority of decisions and
by the text writers that it is error to permit a witness to whom
the prosecutrix has detailed the particulars of a crime of this
character to repeat to the jury what she said in relation thereto,
especially where the witness details the particulars of the oc-
currence. In a few of the jurisdictions the details of the
complaint are held admissible for the purpose of corroborating
the prosecutrix, but, as above stated, the great weight of
authority is that any person to whom she has made a complaint
or detailed the circumstances is not permitted, when placed
on the witness stand, to repeat all of the details and particulars
as reported to the witness by her .... The rule and the reason
therefor are given by Judge Allen in the leading case of Brogy
v. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 722, decided in 1853. It is
there stated, 'though it is competent to prove a fact of a recent
complaint by the female for the purpose of sustaining her
credit, it is not competent to prove the particulars of her
complaint.' ,11
It was not claimed in the Peck case, however, that the statement
in question was admissible as a Spontaneous Declaration. But that
claim was made in State v. Coram,"51 the leading West Virginia case
in point. In the Coram case the challenged assertions were made
soon after the attack, and it was held by the trial court that the
115E.g., corroboration by similar statements after impeachment. See
WIMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1137, 1138.
'd1See THAYER, CASES ON EviDENcE 641, 643-645 (2d ed. 1900); McKELvEY,
EVIDENCE § 234 (4th ed. 1932). Even Wigmore discusses this problem under
the heading "Special Forms of the Exception", although he argues in favor of
the application of the ordinary Spontaneous Declarations exception. See
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1760, 1761.
"1 90 W. Va. 272, 110 S.E. 715 (1922).
118 Id. at 275, 276, 110 S.E. at 716.
119 116 W. Va. 492, 182 S.E. 83 (1935).
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complainant, a child five and one-half years old, was incompetent
to testify, so that the proposed use of the extrajudicial statements
as to details unquestionably violated the hearsay rule, as the court
seems to have conceded. In affirming the admissibility of this
evidence, the court said:
"The attorney general contends that the statements of the
child are admissible as part of the res gestae. Statements are
admissible as such if spontaneous and made while under the
influence of the transaction itself .... [The child's] conversa-
tion with her mother occurred within a few minutes after she
had been attacked . .. Under such circumstances, it seems
beyond question that her statement was spontaneous. ... There
is a division of authority on the reception of such a statement
. . . where the injured female does not testify. The later
authorities favor its admission when part of the res gestae....
'Under this theory, therefore, although the victim of rape is
not a witness, both her complaints, and the details thereof,
are admissible, where the circumstances are such that they
constitute a part of the res gestae.' "120
A rather recent Virginia case, McCann v. Commonwealth,
12
1
admits a detailed statement to prove the identity of the assailant.
In discussing the admissibility of the extrajudicial assertion, the
court relied largely upon Hill v. Commonwealth,122 a case involving
a violent non-sex crime. Said the court:
"In Hill's case, . . . the court had under consideration a
similar question to the one under review. After citing the
"case of Rex v. Foster, 25 Eng. C. L. R. 421, the court laid down
this rule: 'All that is necessary, according to these cases, to
make the declaration part of the res gestae, is that it should be
made recently after receiving the injury, and before he had
time to make up a story, or devise anything for his own
advantage. Tested by this rule, the statement referred to is
clearly admissible.' "123
From the reasoning and holding of the Virginia court in the
McCann case, and from the tenor of the opinion of the West Vir-
ginia court in the Coram case, it seems clear that both courts
applied the ordinary Spontaneous Declarations exception. Several
120 Id. at 494, 495, 182 S.E. at 84-85.
121 174 Va. 429, 4 S.E. 2d 768 (1939).
122 See 2 Gratt. (43 Va.) 594 (1845).
123 174 Va. at 439, 440, 4 S.E.2d at 771.
11
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decisions from other jurisdictions are accord, and some of these cases
include violent sex crimes other than rape or attempted rape.12'
This view seems quite sound, provided of course that the challenged
hearsay assertion was made while the declarant was under the
stress of a nervous excitement caused by the attack, and provided
that the other requirements of this exception are present, par-
ticularly the requirement next to be considered.
8. Is the challenged declaration admissible to prove that
that there was an exciting event? Or must that pre-
liminary fact be established by competent evidence
dehors the declaration?
Under other exceptions to the hearsay rule, we first prove
the preliminary fact upon which the admissibility of the challenged
assertion depends.125  For example, an admission by an alleged
agent is receivable against his alleged principal only if the admis-
sion was made by one who was an agent and while he was acting
within the scope of his authority. But the fact of agency may not
be proved by the challenged extrajudicial assertion of the alleged
agent to the effect that he is, or was, an agent: to permit that
would be begging the question: it would be permitting the declara-
tion in dispute to life itself into the case by its own bootstraps. 12
This hearsay danger presents itself to an unusual degree in
cases of violent sex offenses.12 7 But it often arises in other types
of adjudication. An important case In point is Armour v. Industrial
Comm'n.12s In that case an issue was whether an employee had
received an injury by a fall and whether this injury was sustained
in the course of his employment; also it was necessary to prove this
by technically competent evidence. A statement made by the
employee shortly after the alleged fall was regarded by the court
as admissible if competent evidence established that there had
124See, e.g., State v. Gorman, 229 Minn. 524, 40 N.W.2d 347 (1949) (in-
decent assault on a boy less than 4 years of age). See, collecting cases in point,
WIGI o, , EVIDENCE § 1761, especially 1953 Supp.
125 See WIGMOIE, EVIDENCE § 1761.
126 This is apparently never disputed. See WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1078; JONES,
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 255 (4th ed. 1938).
127In the West Virginia case of State v. Coram, supra note 119, heretofore
discussed in the body of this article, the happening of a nervous shock
(attempted rape) was perhaps sufficiently established by evidence dehors the
declaration. The court, however, seems to have ignored the point.
128 78 Colo. 569, 243 Pac. 546 (1926).
12
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been such fall. But the only proof of this fall was that the em-
ployee had said, "I got a dirty fall .... I went to turn the ice
machine off of center and the lever slipped." There was no
evidence that the employee was then suffering pain. The court
held that the statement by the employee, the evidence in dispute,
was admissible under this exception to prove that there was such
a fall. There are several other cases accord, or seemingly accord.129
The principal West Virginia case in point, which seems to
be regarded by some as permitting the hearsay in dispute to be so
used, 130 is Collins v. Equitable Life Insurance Co.131 In that case
an issue was whether the insured had sustained an accidental
injury. There were no eyewitnesses to the alleged accident. The
challenged hearsay assertion offered to prove that there was an
accident was that the insured upon entering his office one morning
said that he had "slipped on the icy pavement and fallen."
In discussing the admissibility of this hearsay statement, and
after declaring the evidence admissible, the court said:
"We are aware that a number of authorities have said
there must be 'a main or principal fact', which the declaration
illustrates. . . . Some authorities go further, saying 'The act
itself must be first established before the illustrative declara-
tions can be admitted. . . . Mr. Wigmore says these limitations
are 'spurious', having been borrowed from what he terms 'the
verbal act doctrine,' and having no proper place in the doctrine
of res gestae. He further says that expressions such as those
above are 'frequent enough,' but that there seems to be no
ruling in the United States turning directly upon such 'sup-
posed limitations.' . . . Whether or not his criticism is well
taken, there is unquestionably much confusion on the subject
of res gestae .... This, however, seems settled: ... when [as in
this case] appearances indicate that one has suffered an injury,
a statement by him, if spontaneous and reasonably coincident
with, and explanatory of, the occurrence, may be regarded as
a part of it, and be competent evidence under the res gestae
doctrine." 32
129 See, e.g., Johnson v. W. S. Nott Co., 183 Minn. 809, 236 N.W. 466 (1981);
Young v. Stewart, 191 N.C. 297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926); Bunker v. Motor Wheel
Corp., 231 Mich. 884, 204 N.W. 110 (1925); National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
Hedges, 288 Ky. 840, 27 S.W.2d 422 (1980).
130 Cf. MORGAN & MAGUIRE, CASES ON EVIDENcF 732n. (3d ed. 1951): "The
declarant wvas apparently in great pain when he reached his office, but there
wvas no evidence as to the cause of his pain except his own statement that he
had fallen on the ice."
1g,122 W. Va. 171, 8 S.E.2d 825 (1940).
132 Id. at 178, 174, 8 S.E.2d 826.
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From this language of the court, it is perhaps arguable that
the court condemns, as a "spurious limitation", the quoted propo-
sition that "the act itself must be first established before the
illustrative declaration can be admitted." It is submitted, how-
ever, that the result reached in the Collins case is sound; for there
was evidence, apart from the challenged hearsay statement, that
there had been a startling occurrence: there was competent evi-
dence that, when the declarant parked his car, he was in his usual
health and that about ten minutes later, when he entered his
office, it was evident from his physical appearance and otherwise
that he was in great pain: "he would lay down and then get up
. . . .He was moaning and groaning"; also "his arms were
bruised."133
All this would seem sufficient proof, apart from the challenged
hearsay statement, that the declarant had just experienced some
shock producing the kind of nervous excitement requisite under
this exception. The measure of persuasion on preliminary deci-
sions by the trial judge differs somewhat in different courts.13 4
The West Virginia view has been judicially expressed as follows
in the leading case of State v. Meek: 35
"It is the general rule that courts should determine all
questions relating to the admission of evidence... The ruling
of the trial court on such a question [of fact] will not be
disturbed on review when there is legal evidence to support
it unless it is clearly erroneous."'1,30
But is hearsay, which is inadmissible by the ordinary rules of
evidence, sufficient per se to sustain a trial court's preliminary
ruling on a question of fact? In the Meek case, it was contended
that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the trial court's
ruling that the declarant (in a Dying Declarations case) was "under
the realization of impending death." The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals made its decision turn on the sufficiency of the
'33 Id. at 172, 8 S.E.2d at 825, 826.
134 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Polian, 288 Mass. 494, 498, 193 N.E. 68, 70
(1934); WIGAoRa, EvIDENcE § 2550; MORGAN & MAGUIRE, CASES ON EVIDENCE 623,
624n. (3d ed. 1951): "Where the orthodox rule is recognized it is usually said
that the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review if there is
evidence which would justify a reasonable trier in so finding, but the appellate
court sometimes seems to substitute its judgment for that of the judge below."
135W. Va. 324, 148 S.E. 208 (1929).
6 Id. at 329, 148 S.E. at 210.
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deceased's hearsay declaration to the effect that he knew he did not
have long to live. The court said that the hearsay evidence was
"sufficient legally to justify the ruling" by the trial court.137  In
that case, however, the challenged hearsay declaration, which seems
to have lifted itself into the case by its own bootstraps, really did
not do so; for the dying declarant's statement that he was aware
that he was about to die would be admissible under another
exception to the hearsay rule, namely, Declarations Evidencing
Physical or Mental Condition. 3  The court, however, did not
mention this point.
The case of Insurance Co. v. Mosley,-3 decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, is perhaps the leading case on this
general question. In that case there was an issue as to whether
the assured had lost his life by accident. There were no eye-
witnesses to the alleged accident, a fall. The court held that
declarations by the assured that he had just fallen downstairs and
almost killed himself were admissible. There was, however, other
evidence showing that there had been a startling occurrence. At
the time the assured spoke, it was proved that "his voice trembled;
he complained of his head, and appeared to be faint and in great
pain."'.40 Consequently, the Mosley case, like the West Virginia
decision in the Collins case, seems sound enough.
It should be pointed out, however, that in cases before ad-
ministrative tribunals, where in general the technical rules of evi-
dence do not obtain, such hearsay declarations may be admitted as
tending to prove that there was a startling occurrence, e.g., a fall
causing the injury, although it is generally held that such an
administrative finding of fact may not be based solely on hearsay
incompetent by the ordinary rules of evidence.' 4 1 But in all types
of cases where the hearsay rule obtains, there would seem to be
little or no justification for the decisions holding that the hearsay
statement may be used to establish the preliminary question of fact
upon which its admissibility depends. The only justification for
137 Id. at 330, 148 S.E. at 210.
138 See e.g., State v. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741 (1875); State v. Cook, 81 W. Va.
686, 695 (1918); Stevens v. Friedman, 58 W. Va. 78, 51 S.E. 132 (1905); WIGMOaE,
EVIDENCE §§ 1714-1731.
133 8 Wall. 397 (U.S. 1869).
1401d. at 403.
.41See Machala v. Ott, 108 W. Va. 391, 151 S.E. 313 (1930); Machala v.
Compensation Commission, 109 W. Va. 413, 155 S.E. 169 (1930); WiGMoRE,
EvMENCE § 4c.
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such holdings would seem to lie in the Wigmorean pronounce-
ment, supported by some authority, that "In preliminary rulings
by a judge on the admissibility of evidence, the ordinary rules of
evidence do not apply."'142 The soundness of this proposition with
respect to all its implications is, however, at least doubtful; and
several if not most of the square decisions on the point seem to
forbid the judge to receive hearsay inadmissible by jury trial rules
when he is making his preliminary decisions . 43  Perhaps it would
be justifiable, as in controversies before administrative tribunals,
to consider the challenged hearsay declaration along with other
evidence, but there should be other competent evidence: hearsay
which is inadmissible by the ordinary rules should not be a sufficient
basis for even a preliminary decision by a trial judge: the hearsay
dangers are too great; and, interestingly, even Wigmore seems to
sanction this view, a position somewhat inconsistent with his
above-quoted major proposition. 1 44
Before concluding this rather rambling discussion, perhaps it
would not be inappropriate to add a further word, in a general
way, with respect to the dangerous uncertainties inherent in the
use of the res gestae terminology as a method of determining
whether hearsay is admissible; and these dangers are strikingly
demonstrated by two comparatively recent cases: Dorsey v. Pruden-
tial Insurance Co. of America, 4- decided by the West Virginia
court; and Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Heatfield, '46 decided
142 WIG-MoRE, EVIDENCE § 1385.
143 See Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies
as to Admissibility, 36 YALE L.J. 1101, 1121 (1927).
144"There is, however, an apparent flaw in this argument [in favor of
admissibility], which seems to nullify it. For example, in a railroad collision,
we have the exciting causes known by other evidence; and under other
Exceptions to the Hearsay rule-for example, regular entries, we first prove the
regularity of the entries by other evidence. Now in the present case, if we
accept the complaint testimonially, do we not admit it in advance as evidence
of these very circumstances which should first be proved to make it admissible?
"The solution seems to be as follows: If there is no other evidence of an
assault, or where there is evidence merely of intercourse but not necessarily
against the woman's consent, we are in truth committing the error of accepting
her statement as itself evidence of the very facts which should first be otherwise
shown in order to make the declarations spontaneous. But if there is already
other evidence of a violent assault, and the statement is useful as disclosing the
identity of the assailant or the further circumstances of the assault, we are
not reasoning in a circle, and there is no objection to admitting the statement."
WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE § 1761.
145 124 W. Va. 100, 19 S.E.2d 152 (1942).
146 141 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944).
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by a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The facts in these cases
were quite similar, but different results were reached.
In the West Virginia case, the issue was whether the death of
the insured was caused by accidental means. There was competent
evidence that the insured, an employee at a store, appeared to be
in good health when he went to work one morning. But he became
quite sick shortly before noon, and while he was being transported
to his home in an automobile, the car had to be stopped twice
to let the insured get out, and on one occasion he "gagged like
he was trying to vomit." When he was delivered at his home at
about 2:00 P.M., "he was deathly pale, was bent over holding his
stomach," and according to the testimony of a domestic, "the first
thing he said was, get the doctor, and then he said he had hurt
himself from lifting boxes." A physician was called and it was
found, both by diagnosis and by surgical operation performed at
4:00 P.M., that the insured had ruptured a duodenal ulcer. The
court held that the declarant's statement was not admissible "as a
part of the res gestae."
In the other case, there was an issue as to whether the insured
had died of heart failure brought on by overexertion (lifting); and
it was contended that statements made by the insured an hour and
a half after the exertion took place were not sufficiently spontaneous
to be admissible under this exception. But the court, in a well-
reasoned opinion, held the evidence admissible. Said the court
(inter alia):
"... extreme exertion and pain would be, to him who ex-
periences them, facts sufficient to satisfy the theory of admis-
sibility as part of the res gestae. The declarations were made
by the only participant in the accident; he suffered severe pain
from the time of the exertion until some time after he made
the statements in question; it was pain which was followed
by his death within twelve hours and pain which, according to
the testimony, was excruciating. Such anguish negatives the
existence of reflective thought. There is nothing in the evi-
dence arousing any suspicion of deliberation on the part of
the declarant, but on the contrary there is every appearance
of spontaneity.' ' 4 7
The West Virginia case seems to have relied unduly on the
rationale of contemporaneity supposedly inherent in the res gestae
147Id. at 651.
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terminology. The court ruled the hearsay inadmissible for the
reason that "The evidence adduced by the plaintiff does not fix
the time, even approximately, on September 12th, when the rupture
of the doudenum occurred."'148 It is respectfully submitted that
the pivotal question of fact in the case is not "when the rupture of
the duodenum occurred;" for the startling event or condition was
not the physical rupture, not the initial occurrence: it was, as
indicated in the Heatfield case, the intense pain brought on by the
injury or ailment. And that "startling" pain was, to some extent
at least, a continuing occurrence or condition, so much so that it
would not matter if "the rupture" had occurred several hours
before the statement was made, provided of course that the extreme
pain brought on by the rupture (or ailment) had been sufficiently
continuous to keep the reflective faculties stilled to such an extent
as to negative the likelihood of a fabricated story. The reasoning
of the court in the Heatfield case (if applied to the Dorsey case)
would have required a ruling on the question whether the declar-
ant, at the time he made the statement in dispute, was still under
the stress of a nervous excitement caused by the intense pain.
It should be noted that the exclusion of the evidence in the
Dorsey case cannot be explained on the ground that the challenged
hearsay declaration was not usable to prove the happening of the
startling occurrence; for in that case, as in the Heatfield case, there
was other and competent evidence as to the existence of excruciating
pain. 1.4 9 The exclusion of the hearsay in the Dorsey case may have
been justifiable, but it may well have been that the evidence was
admissible.
In conclusion, it is submitted that there is but one effective
remedy for most of the inconsistencies and uncertainties herein
considered; and that remedy is nowhere more interestingly indicated
than in a famous colloquy between Holmes, J., and an attorney
by the name of Linscott who was trying a case before Holmes and
attempting to get in some hearsay evidence. An unofficial report
of the colloquy runs in part as follows: "No," said the Judge, "the
hearsay rule has been a good deal nibbled round the edges, but
nobody has taken quite such a bite out of it as that! And I think
I won't set the example." "Not as a part of the res gestae?" sug-
148 124 W. Va. at 105, 19 S.E.2d at 154.
149 Id. at 102, 103, 19 S.E.2d at 153: "he was deathly pale, was bent over
holding his stomach ... gagged like he was trying to vomit."
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gested the lawyer hopefully. "The man that uses that phrase,"
retorted Holmes, "shows that he has lost temporarily all power of
analyzing ideas! For my part I prefer to give articulate reasons
for my decisions'" 150 In like vein, Judge Learned Hand (may his
tribe increase!), in discussing the admissibility of an extrajudicial
declaration which an attorney sought to have excluded on the
ground that it was not a part of the res gestae, made this memorable
remark: ". . . as for 'res gestae', it is a phrase which has been
accountable for so much confusion that it had best be denied any
place whatever in legal terminology; if it means anything but an
unwillingness to think at all, what it covers cannot be put in less
intelligible terms."' 5'
If all judges, lawyers, too-for the arguments and briefs of
counsel greatly influence the progress of the law-would adopt the
commendable Holmes-Hand remedy, and not only interpret the
so-called res gestae exception in terms of unreflectiveness based on
spontaneity but abandon completely the dangerous res gestae termi-
nology, a legal reform of the first magnitude would be achieved
almost overnight. Great, however, is the tyranny of words; and
great indeed is the res gestae tyranny which, sad to relate, was
started on its tyrannous way by two notoriously ignorant men.3 2
There ought to be a law against res gestae!
250 See MORGAN & MAGUIRE, CASES ON EVIDENCE 687, n. 85-excerpt from
"J. B. Thayer's memorandum books."
151 In United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944).
152 The phrase "res gesta" [res gestae] is found "first in the mouths of
Garrow and Lord Kenyon,-two famously ignorant men." See THAYER, LEGAL
ESSAYS 207, 244n. (1908).
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